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We study the French dilemma associated with court administered resolution of corporate 
financial distress of firms, in which bankruptcy courts have to combine both social efficiency 
(maintaining employment) and ex post financial efficiency (determining the best issue for 
financial distress, proxied here by the global recovery rate). We discuss this dilemma 
empirically, using a large sample of decisions of French commercial courts concerning the future 
of bankrupt firms (reorganization, sale as a going concern or liquidation). Addressing this 
dilemma, we discuss the determinants of bankruptcy courts’ selection between rival offers in 
sales as a going concern. Finally, we evaluate the financial cost of the French pro debtor system 
through the recovery rates of various claimants. Our main results are: (1) French commercial 
courts actively work to protect employment by facilitating continuation and reducing the domino 
effects of bankruptcy. (2) the courts’ choice between rival buyout offers confirms that social 
considerations prevail in the arbitration of bankruptcy courts. (3) Continuations through 
reorganization plans generate the highest recovery rates for all classes of creditors. (4) Contrary 
to the expected trade-off between social and financial efficiency, courts also enact measures to 
increase debt recovery once continuation has been chosen. However, for sales, recovery rates are 
inhibited by asset illiquidity and/or by the courts’ attempt to promote a firm’s continuation 
through sales at a low price. 
 
JEL classification: G33; K22. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the work of Bebchuck (1988), and Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992)
5, the theoretical 
literature on bankruptcy law has had a twofold focus. First, is the bankruptcy process ex post 
efficient, maximizing the post bankruptcy value of the firm to share between all claimants? 
Second, is bankruptcy law ex ante efficient, providing for all stakeholders to have the right 
incentives (notably credit rationing (Longhofer (1998), Povel (1999)), over-investment (Gertner, 
Scharfstein (1991), Eberhart and Senbet (1993), Longhofer and Carlstrom (1995)), monitoring 
(Cornelli and Felli (1997)), managerial entrenchment (Bebchuk and Picker (1996))). Empirical 
studies dealing with bankruptcy practices in U.S. and European countries are currently booming, 
and the recent Doing Business reports
6 have led to many studies of the effects of national 
bankruptcy codes. Studies include the shutdown/continuation decision of U.S. commercial courts 
(Morrison (2007)), the recovery rates and the way banks react to the differences in creditor’s 
legal protections between UK, Germany and France (Davydenko and Franks (2007)), the 
evaluation of secured creditor priority violation in Chapter 11 (Weiss and Capkun (2007)), the 
impact of regional political characteristics on Russian judicial decisions concerning the number 
and type of bankruptcies (Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin and Zhuravskaya (2006)), and the 
duration and costs associated with the Swedish auction bankruptcy system relative to the U.S. 
reorganization procedure (Thorburn (2000)). 
 
These researches are of interest because all industrial economics tend to adjust their corporate 
reorganization procedure so as to make them quicker and more efficient at lower cost. Their 
objectives differ, however. Some promote liquidation, to ensure larger recovery rates for secured 
creditors and prevent competition distortion in favour of financially distressed firms, but others 
promote continuation in order to generate some economic value within the bankrupt firm, or to 
maintain employment. Recent works supervised by the World Bank, classifying countries 
according to their level of secured creditor’s legal protection and the characteristics of their 
bankruptcy legislation, show large differences between European countries
7. There are various 
levels of stakeholder protection (pro creditor vs. pro debtor systems) and court interventionism 
(private or out-of-court system vs. court administered procedures). For instance, U.K. bankruptcy 
rules permit secured creditors (especially those with floating charge) to sell the bankrupt firm’s 
assets to cancel their debts, whether reorganization or liquidation is chosen. In the German 
system, the floating charge does not exist, but secured creditors (as in U.K. system) may veto 
reorganization plans, allowing them some control over the restructuring process. 
 
French procedures are the most pro-debtor. France consequently faces certain critical comments. 
First, French law is explicitly intended to save bankrupt firms in order to protect employment. 
The first article of the 1985 bankruptcy code orders the various objectives of the law as: 
“safeguarding the business, maintaining the firm’s operations and discharging liabilities”
8. 
                                                 
5 See Hart (2000) for a review of the core literature dealing with economic analysis of bankruptcy law. 
6 These reports, edited by the World Bank, involve empirical measures of bankruptcy law, securities law and law 
enforcement. 
7 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) largely developed this approach, which combines Law and 
Finance. 
8 Weber (2005) explores the effects of this French legal priority set on agency problems between bankrupt firms their 
debtholders. Weber argues that French firms have few incentives to file for bankruptcy, due to the court administered   3
Second, French bankruptcy process involves a major paradox: nearly 90% of French bankruptcy 
filings end up in liquidations
9 although the bankruptcy code promotes continuation (this figure is 
comparable to the U.K. case, where 90% of bankrupt firms disappear through liquidation). 
 
In this paper, we explore a large sample of bankruptcies in order to evaluate the outcomes of 
French bankruptcy law., Our aim is to provide a benchmark for discussions of the relative 
merits/drawbacks of such a strong pro-debtor model. Our first purpose is to test whether the first 
article of bankruptcy law decisively influences the activities of the commercial courts, since 
liquidation, reorganization and sale as a going concern of bankrupt firms are wholly controlled by 
the court. We argue that French commercial courts must deal with a particular dilemma, and 
explicitly arbitrate between financial efficiency (choosing to maximize the value of assets and 
reduce type 1 and type 2 errors during the bankruptcy process
10) and social efficiency 
(maintaining employment through the bankrupt firm’s continuation). It is generally agreed that 
pro-debtor bankruptcy codes are more likely to allow economically inefficient firms to 
reorganize, whereas pro-creditor bankruptcy models are more likely to promote liquidation. Our 
second purpose is to evaluate the financial efficiency of the French bankruptcy process through 
global recovery rates for various outcomes. Here, the crucial question is whether the work of 
commercial courts, i.e. the court administered rescue of failing companies (to preserve 
employment), has a cost. In other words, does such a pro-debtor system significantly reduce the 
proceeds to be shared between all claimants in continuation cases? And what are the differences 
between the various legal outcomes of bankruptcy? Our main findings can be summarized as 
follows. 
 
When we analyse the decision making of courts on the final issue of bankruptcy, it appears that 
French commercial courts do work to promote continuation in order to improve social efficiency. 
Indeed, continuation remains the best way to preserve employment and reduce domino effects on 
suppliers or trade creditors, who are often junior or unsecured claimants and face financial 
distress following the bankruptcy of their clients. We also provide empirical evidence that the 
protection of employment acts as a guide to discriminate between rival offers in the case of sale 
as a going concern. We find that courts operate under severe constraints (the financial and 
economic characteristics of bankrupt firms), which were reduced by the development of 
prevention, through the legal reform of 1994. 
 
We also show, contrary to expectation about such a debtor friendly system, that this orientation of 
bankruptcy law does not imply a severe cost for stakeholders, especially in reorganization cases. 
This conclusion is not, however, valid for sale as a going concern, since both liquidation and sale 
as a going concern generate similar levels of debt recovery. Finally, for continuation cases and 
also for liquidation cases, we highlight the factors that influence global recovery rates, 
considering whether courts seek also to raise debt recoveries, especially when reorganization 
tends to be the final outcome. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
process (stakeholders have no role in the bankruptcy process) and the civil and criminal sanctions associated with 
bankruptcy. 
9 Source: Domens (2007). 
10 Type 1 errors occur when some economically inefficient failing firms are mistakenly categorized as efficient and 
allowed to reorganize. Type 2 errors occur when economically efficient but failing firms liquidate, though they 
would generate higher value by reorganizing.   4
Below, Section 2 summarizes the literature on empirical studies of bankruptcy legislation. 
Section 3 sets out the French bankruptcy code. Section 4 describes the dataset and provides 
summary statistics. Section 5 presents the first empirical evidence of the French dilemma, giving 
models of determinants of the decisions of French commercial courts about the outcome of 
financial distress (reorganization, sale as a going concern or liquidation), and about choices 
between rival offers in cases of sale as a going concern. Section 6 examines the consequences and 
costs of the French legislation, focusing on the levels and the determinants of global recovery 
rates. Section 7 presents our conclusions. 
 
 
II. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Our first topic concerns the criteria for the choices of commercial courts between the rival 
approaches to financial distress. Empirical research tends to acknowledge the discrepancy 
between the written law and the procedures as they are enforced: for small firms under Chapter 
11 procedure, Morrison (2007) demonstrates that U.S. commercial courts rarely allow failing 
firms to remain under their protection when their liquidation would be optimal
11. Lambert-
Mogiliansky, Sonin and Zhuravskaya (2006) prove, using a firm level database, that Russian 
commercial courts are largely dependent on regional governors and aim to keep some control 
over assets of financially distressed firms
12. We also consider some new behavioural law and 
economics papers which focus on the perception bias of judges. Marinescu (2007) demonstrates 
that judges’ decisions concerning unfair dismissals are influenced by the labour market 
conditions (unemployment rate) and the macro economic context
13. Rachlinski, Guthrie and 
Wistrich (2007) consider whether specialized bankruptcy judges make better decisions than 
judges who are generalists. In particular, they test the capacity of specialized judges to resist the 
influence of common heuristics when making their decisions. Their main result is that they too 
are vulnerable to outside pressures, like non specialized judges. 
 
A second focus of the empirical literature on corporate bankruptcy concerns the duration, cost 
and creditors’ recovery rates involved in various ways to resolve financial distress. In this area, 
the most studied feature of bankruptcy law is the violation of the absolute priority rule (A.P.R.) in 
the U.S. reorganization process (Chapter 11). This deviation means that senior claims, such as 
secured creditors’ ones, are not fully satisfied before junior creditors, especially equity holders, 
receive any payment. Recently, Weiss and Capkun (2007) suggested that the last changes in 
commercial courts’ practice and the strengthening of secured creditor’s rights in U.S. bankruptcy 
law may explain why violations of A.P.R. have decreased since research from the previous 
decade (Franks and Torous (1989), Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt (1990), Weiss (1990) and 
Betker (1995)). Weiss and Kapkun find also that bankruptcy costs increased in the period 1993-
2004 because reorganization took longer (the length of the reorganization process in the U.S. is 
                                                 
11 Morrison (2007) also gives statistics on the duration and cost of the US legal reorganization process, which are 
useful for comparison with French bankruptcy process as the two samples are quite similar. 
12 For other reasons than political strategy, Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2006) measure the effect of 1997 Belgian 
bankruptcy code reform on bankruptcy rates. 
13 Here, the bankruptcy rate (and also the unemployment rate) serves as a proxy to measure the economic conditions 
in which firms operate. 
15 We do not use their results on recovery rates for various stakeholders, because they test a sample of firms with 
assets in excess of US$100 millions to highlight deviations in favour of equity holders.   5
on average 465 days
15). Another way to violate the A.P.R. described above is by debtor-in-
possession financing which provides a super-priority status to post filing loans in order to 
encourage lenders to extend the further loans needed for continuation. Dahiya, John, Pury and 
Ramirez (2003) show that the over-investment problem (the expected effect of this post filing 
financing) is not severe in practice. Such loans also allow bankrupt firms to emerge more quickly 
and successfully from the reorganization process.  
 
A further related topic is the ability of private solutions to resolve financial distress. The 
mechanism best suited to determine and to apportion the appropriate (or highest) value of a 
bankrupt firm’s assets is an auction (Bebchuck (1988)). Once the firm has filed for bankruptcy, 
an automatic stay on creditors’ claims prevents them from dismantling assets before a sale may 
be undertaken. According to the highest bidder (which depends largely on the demand side 
conditions rather than the court’s decision), the financially distressed firm is either sold as a 
going concern, or is piecemeal liquidated allowing assets to move to their best use in the future. 
In Sweden, all bankrupt firms are turned over to a court-appointed official, who organizes an 
open cash-only auction to arbitrate between a continuation sale or a piecemeal liquidation. This 
situation has been studied by Thorburn (2000) and Strömberg (2000) in order to shed light on the 
merits of the auction relative to the classical reorganization process. Thorburn (2000) finds in 
practice that auctions are speedy (on average two months), have low direct bankruptcy costs, and 
exhibit similar levels of recovery rate to those reported by Franks and Torous (1994) for a sample 
of Chapter 11 cases
16. On the other hand, Strömberg (2000) demonstrates that Swedish cash 
auctions, as compared to reorganizations, are immune to conflicts of interest between claimants, 
and that continuation, through a sale of assets to the incumbent manager, is a common way to 




Finally, Davydenko and Franks (2007) explore, in a cross country analysis including U.K., 
Germany and France, the expected effects of national bankruptcy codes on bank debt contracts 
(size of the loan, level and type of collateral, and interest rate). Using, as in our case
18, a sample 
of small and medium sized bankrupt firms, they find evidence that large differences in banks’ 
legal rights across these countries correlate with significant differences in banking strategies and 
outcomes. In particular, French banks have a Coasian approach to their national pro-debtor 
bankruptcy code. They require more collateral than lenders in the UK or Germany. They rely also 
on special collateral forms which minimize the risk of dilution during the court-administered 
bankruptcy process. Finally, they find that bank recovery rates remain inferior in France due to 
the lack of creditor protection; France is ranked third in this sample. The strength of this approach 
is to include both bankruptcies and informal renegotiations. Yet the results obtained are restricted 
to bankers’ claims only. 
 
                                                 
16 Eckbo and Thorburn (2007) recently studied the issue of fire sale auctions and found that this phenomenon appears 
in piecemeal liquidation but not in sales as a going concern. They also study the variables which influence the bid 
price.  
17 In particular, these inefficient liquidations are frequently avoided through sale-backs (i.e. sales of assets to 
incumbent managers) when markets are illiquid. Market illiquidity implies that industry indebtedness is high and the 
firm has few non-specific assets.  
18 We prefer to focus on global recovery rates (including all stakeholders), in order to determine the ex post 
efficiency of the overall bankruptcy process.    6
This review of recent empirical studies shows that no previous studies have looked closely at the 
determinants of commercial court decisions between the competing outcomes of corporate 
financial distress. We oppose both pre-default variables (such as measures of financial distress, 
economic value of assets, or causes of default) and post-default variables (such as the measures 
engaged by the court) in order to better understand the factors which statistically make an impact 
on the future of bankrupt firms. We explore also, for the first time, how such a court administered 
process may discriminate between rival offers in the case of sales as a going concern. We also 
take into account below both financial and social efficiencies of bankruptcy law so as to study to 
what extent the law may, at the same time, promote continuation in order to preserve 
employment, and protect the interests of all other claimants. Our analysis should also be viewed 
as an evaluation of recovery rates for all classes of creditors, whereas previous studies dealt with 
fewer classes of creditors, sometimes with only secured banks. Finally, our large dataset drawn 
from the period 1984-2005 allows us to highlight the impact of the 1994 legal reform (which we 
interpret as the development of prevention among financially distressed firms) on both decision 
making by courts and the financial efficiency of bankruptcy law through global recoveries. 
 
 
III. FRENCH BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION 
 
Since the bankruptcy law reforms of 01/25/1985 and 06/10/1994, the French collective system 
involves two complementary court administered procedures. The first aims at continuing 
business, either through a reorganization plan or sale as a going concern (“redressement 
judiciaire”). The second is a classical liquidation procedure of a firm’s assets (“liquidation”). In 
the shadow of the process, there also exists an out-of-court settlement (“règlement amiable”) in 
which the manager, with the help of an officer appointed by the bankruptcy judge, negotiates 
with some of the claimants the payment of outstanding debts. In order to reach a settlement, this 
procedure is not public (not all creditors are informed that the financially distressed firm is 
negotiating with some of its claimants
19) and allows the bankruptcy judge to ask for a stay of 
creditors’ claims (in which case the procedure becomes public). In January 2006, French 
bankruptcy law was changed to allow for easier bankruptcy filings. These may now be initiated 
voluntarily by managers, creditors or the court, even if the financially distressed firm is not “en 
cessation des paiements”. In the previous bankruptcy system, financially distressed firms had to 
be largely unable to pay debts before they could file for bankruptcy. Since 2006, all firms that 
face the possibility of going bankrupt in the future may initiate a bankruptcy filing
20. However, as 
the data are not available to cover this most recent reform, we focus on the period 1985-2005. In 
all regressions and descriptive statistics (cf. sections IV to VI), we split our bankruptcy cases in 
two sub-samples, running 1989-1994 and 1994-2005, to take into account the 1994 reform of 
bankruptcy law, and to evaluate the effect of this change. The main legal innovations in 1994 
were: 1) a change in the absolute priority rule in case of liquidation (secured creditors are now 
paid before those creditors who offer credit after firms file for bankruptcy), 2) the judge may 
pursue agents who buy bankrupt firms in order to sell them piecemeal once bankruptcy process is 
closed; and, 3) the judge can immediately liquidate financially distressed firms if he considers it 
                                                 
19 This confidentiality facilitates negotiation between a smaller number of creditors and reduces the risk of a fall in 
the firm’s economic value due to the revelation of financial distress to the stakeholders.  
20 Since the earlier that firms file for bankruptcy, the less financially distressed they are, reorganization rates and 
recovery rates should both increase.   7
impossible for them to continue their operations under the protection of the law (this procedure 
was in practice before 1994 but was not written in the law). These changes in the law did not 
crucially modify the practice of commercial courts. More importantly, we expect that firms which 
filed for bankruptcy after the 1994 bankruptcy reform, are more likely to be worth saving, 
because commercial courts promote prevention among financially distressed firms in the later 
sample (for instance, via the alert procedure
21). In other words, it is specifically the legal 
difference that we consider (and test) between our two samples of bankrupt firms. Over the 
period 1985-2005 studied in this paper, the bankruptcy process is organized as follows. 
 
A. The liquidation 
 
The liquidation process occurs either immediately or after an observation period
22. Once the court 
has ordered liquidation, the commercial court appoints an official who liquidates all the firm’s 
assets to clear debt in an orderly manner. The proceeds are distributed in the following order: the 
most recent salaries are paid first (super privilege), following by administrative expenses of the 
collective procedure, other salaries and claims of tax authorities (privilege). Then the liquidator 
cancels secured debts, which are ranked above the post default creditors
24 (protected by 
“article 40” of French bankruptcy law). Any remainder goes to junior claimants.  
 
B. The continuation 
 
Continuation prevails when the commercial court estimates that a firm might be able to 
reorganize or to be sold as a going concern. At this time the judge stops all creditors’ pursuits in 
order to facilitate reorganization, because the firm’s assets, collateralised or not, are essential to 
continuation. During this observation period (which starts when the court orders the stay on 
creditors’ claims, for up to six months), several measures are engaged. All creditors who offer 
new credit (called new money) have priority over the previous creditors, except when the firm is 
liquidated (see above). The debtor may either stay in place under the authority of the bankruptcy 
judge, or be replaced. An official, appointed by the court, formulates a reorganization plan 
(causes of default, measures for carrying on, schedule of repayment of creditors), which is 
evaluated by the judge. After an examination of the interest of the various parties, the bankruptcy 
judge specifies whether the company should be reorganized according to the continuation plan 
elaborated by the outside official, or whether assets should be sold to a third party. In the latter 
case, the contracts, which are essential for the firm to continue as a going concern, are also 
transferred. In the event of continuation, the superpriority status of the last unpaid salaries still 
applies. These debts rank above all others, which are ordered as follows: “article 40” debts, 
                                                 
21 Via the alert procedure, a bankruptcy court may force a company to develop some economic or financial measures 
to reduce the risk of bankruptcy. The court may also propose that the firm file for an out-of-court settlement such as 
the “règlement amiable”.  
22 The objective of the observation period is to seek another way to alleviate financial distress (for more details, see 
paragraph B.) ***SURELY IT’S A LEARNING PROCESS?*** 
24 The reform of bankruptcy law in 1994 changed this absolute priority order; before 1994, creditors protected by 
article 40 were paid before the secured creditors in all bankruptcy cases. The French legislators aimed, with the 
reform of 1994, to improve secured creditor’s rights.   8
privileged debts (other salaries, tax authorities, and bankruptcy costs), secured debts, and finally 
junior claims. 
 
C. Specifics of French bankruptcy law 
 
Upon comparing French bankruptcy procedure with other European legislations and the U.S., we 
find the following differences
25, which make the French code instructive to study regarding the 
economics of financial distress. First, French bankruptcy law explicitly specifies the objectives of 
the collective process: maintaining the firm’s operations in order to preserve employment ranks 
first, before the recovery of liabilities. Second, the commercial court has genuine enforcement 
power during the collective process: the bankruptcy judge decides the adoption of the 
reorganization plan (there is no voting procedure or veto power for stakeholders), and requires an 
automatic stay on creditors’ claims as soon as the firm enters the observation period. Third, the 
French code has a specific procedure dedicated to sales as a going concern.. Fourth, creditors 
who offer new credit after the firm has filed for bankruptcy receive post filing priority (these 
loans are referred to as “article 40” debts). Finally, the court can examine all pre-default contracts 
which appear suspect, in the sense that they would have voluntarily caused a reduction of the 
firm’s value prior to filing for bankruptcy (this examination covers the so-called suspect period). 
 
 
IV. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
A. Data source 
We assembled a large database of French corporate bankruptcy filings over the period 1995-
2005. This is divided into two sub sets, to take into account the 1994 bankruptcy law reform: 716 
filings under the 1985 bankruptcy law, and 288 filings under the 1994 bankruptcy law. 
Specifically, we collected manually information from several documents: the bankruptcy 
declaration form, the Court’s decision and motivations, the list of claims, and the financial-
economic administrator’s report on the bankrupt firm
26. The data were entered on a specific 
template whose general form is described in appendix 2. We looked  only at Parisian courts 
because of ease of collection availability, quality of data, and especially the greater capacity of 
these Courts to develop prevention through out-of-court settlements: since the 1994 bankruptcy 
law reform, the Parisian courts set up prevention units (“cellules de prevention-détection”) which 
aim to audit the firm’s managers when the court receives clear signals of economic / financial 
difficulties. To evaluate this selection bias, we verified that the characteristics of our sample do 
not differ significantly from national figures, in several ways. First, the percentages of various 
outcomes of bankruptcies do not differ from the national averages (liquidations are more than 
90% on average). Second, the sectors in which bankruptcy firms perform and the bankruptcy 
rates in our sample are also quite similar to the national figures. The sole difference is relative to 
the legal form: Paris shows slightly higher frequencies of limited responsibility firms.  
                                                 
25 See White (1996) for a more detailed comparison of U.S. and European countries. 
26 The French original of these documents reads: “déclaration de cessation des paiements, extrait Kbis, jugement 
d'ouverture de la procédure de redressement judiciaire, extraits des jugements modificatifs et jugement définitif sur 
le sort de l'entreprise, bilan économique et social (rédigé par l'administrateur judiciaire), requêtes auprès du juge 
commissaire ainsi que les réponses de celui-ci (ordonnances), états des créances, rapports L13”.   9
 
The first step in constructing the database was to exclude agricultural and financial firms which 
depend on a specific bankruptcy code, and to keep only closed bankruptcy affairs (only closed 
procedures allow us to compute final creditors’ recovery rates). This reduced the sample to 858 
bankrupt firms (596 before 1994, 262 after 1994). We chose also to increase the proportion of 
continuations (i.e. reorganizations and sales) up to 40% of all procedures, in order to obtain a 
more balanced database compared to the national statistics, which exhibit a deep imbalance 
between continuations and liquidations
27. 
 
Among continuations, we used the SIRENE database of INSEE (the French National Institute of 
Statistics) to identify firms whose reorganization failed and consequently ended up in liquidation; 
our recovery rates take into account the probability of success of reorganization plans
28. Since 
these plans last for several years (7 years on average), we used the risk-free interest rate of the 
Treasury to discount the recovery amounts at the time of the court’s decision. Finally, in France, 
some peculiar claims can be repaid out of the collective procedure; this is restricted to the 
providers of goods / merchandises, provided their contractual relations with the firm refer 
explicitly to such protection
29. 
 
For each bankruptcy filing, we gathered data about the firm’s economic and financial difficulties, 
the causes of default (51 codes; see appendix 2), the measures taken by the Courts (33 codes; see 
appendix 2), the outcome of the financial distress (we distinguish between reorganization, sale as 
a going concern, immediate liquidation, and liquidation after an observation period), the 
characteristics of the buyout proposals (sales), and the amounts recovered for each class of 
claimants according to the legal priority rule of claimants set out in section III (for details see 
appendix 1). 
                                                 
27 When computing total statistics, we weighted the figures relative to each outcome in order to have a level of 90% 
of liquidations and 10% for continuations. 
28 For sale as a going concern, we did not investigate whether those firms went bankrupt again later. In such cases, all 
debts come due when the bankrupt firm is sold. 
29 These peculiar securities are (1) “droit de revendication” and (2) “droit de rétention”.   10
B. Summary statistics, terminology and sample structure 
 
The sample firms cover a large cross section of sectors (from 12% to 23% in the commercial 
sector, 23% to 34% in industry, and 44% to 55% for services
30); most of the firms have limited 
liability. To estimate the shortage of liquid assets and to compare the market value of assets and 
the face value of due claims, we used two complementary variables: (1) the variable “assets 
minus claims” measures the market estimated value of total liquid assets minus the total verified 
due claims; (2) the variable “coverage rate” is the ratio of the market value of all assets – 
estimated at the date of triggering – to the total of all due verified claims. The length of the 
procedure gives the number of months between the triggering of the bankruptcy procedure and 
the Court’s final decision
31. Finally, since we did not collect any direct information on the level 
of bankruptcy costs, we estimated them from the legal remunerations of bankruptcy practitioners, 
defined by the French regulation n°85-1390 (Law 12/27/1985) which explicitly relates these 
remunerations to the size of the firm and the outcome of the bankruptcy process
32. In Table 1, the 
legal outcomes (reorganizations, sales, liquidations) are compared to better identify bankrupt 
firms in each outcome. 
 
TABLE 1 



















Nb. of observations 
(sample by issues) 102 88 320 86 - 88 74 80 20 -
 - Limited responsibility 91,9% 86,0% 88,2% 86,3% - 87,5% 86,8% 96,3% 92,0% -
 - Other legal forms 8,1% 14,0% 11,8% 13,7% - 12,5% 13,3% 3,7% 8,0% -
 - Commerce 22,6% 13,0% 23,6% 22,1% - 21,6% 21,7% 20,7% 12,0% -
 - Industry 25,8% 34,0% 32,7% 30,5% - 25,0% 22,9% 24,4% 32,0% -
 - Services 51,6% 53,0% 43,7% 47,4% - 53,4% 55,4% 54,9% 56,0% -











































Coverage rate 36,1% 70,3% 16,3% 24,4% 45.69*** 50,1% 55,1% 37,3% 46,2% 4.30***























5.97*** 10,0% 14,3% 14,0% 9,8% 1,21
Variables whose Fisher's stat. is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***,**, and * respectively.
Figures in parenthesis are the number of missing values.






                                                 
30 These figures are for the period 1985-1994. The percentages over the period 1994-2005 are 18.7% for the 
commercial sector, 27.1% for industry and 54.2% for services. 
31 We do not take into account the period, after the Court’s decision, during which assets are liquidated (which may 
take several months).  
32 We used the ratio (direct bankruptcy cost / recovered amounts), where recovered amounts are based on the 
liquidation proceeds, the sale price or the schedule of repayments in reorganization cases.   11
Upon comparing the samples from before and after the 1994 reform, we observe a significant 
growth in the length of procedures and bankruptcy costs, when commercial courts increased 
prevention during the same period; this may be due to the effect of firm size (measured by the 
number of employees). Also, reorganizations take much time and generate higher bankruptcy 
costs. In contrast, firms which are immediately liquidated present the lowest values for turnovers 
and coverage rates. Moreover, the best performing bankrupt firms, according to their coverage 
rates, carry on through reorganizations, whereas sale as a going concern concentrates on the 
largest firms (measured by turnover and number of employees), probably due to their reputation. 
Finally, Table 1 suggests that decision making in commercial court is strongly influenced by 
economic and financial ratios of bankrupt firms (see Fisher statistics for ANOVA tests). During 
the second period there is a significant reduction in the gap between the coverage rates for each 
outcome of the bankruptcy process. We interpret this change as a consequence of the increase in 
prevention by commercial courts; after 1994, the importance of financial distress is more uniform 
between firms when entering the procedure. 
 
 
V. HOW DOES SOCIAL EFFICIENCY INFLUENCE FRENCH COMMERCIAL COURTS  
DURING THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS? 
 
Our main hypothesis here is that French commercial courts are biased in favour of those 
outcomes which better maintain activity, in order to preserve employment
33: we study how this 
aim is reflected in the probability of reorganization or the probability of sale as a going concern, 
compared to the firm’s liquidation. Initially, we determine: (1) which variables drive the 
bankruptcy courts’ decisions about the three issues of default: reorganization, sale as a going 
concern, and liquidation; and (2) the constraints under which French commercial courts operate 
when they determine the legal outcome of bankruptcy. Then, since there may be several offers in 
the case of sale as a going concern, we explore the criteria used by the court to choose the 
winning offer. We expect that commercial courts are primarily influenced by social norms such 
as employment protection. 
 
A. The choice between continuation and liquidation 
 
We estimate a multinomial logit regression on two samples of firms which went bankrupt either 
under legislation 01/25/1985 (557 companies) or legislation 06/10/1994 (267 companies). The 
dependent variable is the probability that a firm, following the court’s decision, falls into a 
reorganization procedure, is sold as a going concern, or is liquidated. 
 
To describe the court’s decision under constraint
35, we use a first set of ex ante variables, in the 
sense that they constrain the court’s choice between continuation and liquidation. This set covers 
data on the causes of default (see appendix 2.), the characteristics of the bankrupt firm, and the 
                                                 
33 Recall that the first article of French bankruptcy law since 1985 prioritises the safeguarding the business, then 
maintaining the firm’s activity and employment, and finally the discharging of liabilities. 
35 For instance, the probability of sale as a going concern depends strongly on both a demand side constraint (the 
existence of a potential buyer for the firm’s assets) and an offer side constraint (the present value of its assets).   12
levels
36 of various debts. We consider also a set of ex post variables, which specify the court’s 
activity after bankruptcy is triggered off. These variables cover the various measures the courts 
may undertake or allow during the procedure. More precisely, we distinguish between 
“connected measures” and those which are not (see appendix 2). Connected measures are a proxy 
of the court’s efforts to engage measures promoting continuation; they are connected with the 
declared causes of default. For instance, the legal administrator may have engaged measures 
related to outlets, while the original cause of default was (partially or not) due to a fall of outlets. 
By analyzing simply the number of connected and of unconnected measures (whatever their 
type), we reduce the risk of endogeneity between the causes of default and the measures engaged. 
In appendix 3, we test the risk of endogeneity between explanatory variables; in almost all 
cases
37, endogeneity is rejected. We also recognize a third kind of measure, called legal 
measures. These are specific to the French bankruptcy code and are related to the ability of courts 
to enforce the continuation of the firm’s contracts (for instance, electricity, furniture…). 
Furthermore, we test the financial capacity of the firm to continue its business, through the 
coverage rate (i.e. the economic value of assets relative to the debts)
38. The log of the number of 
employees provides a measure of the key factor that we test, i.e. the capacity and the objective of 
courts to maintain employment
39. We include, as control variables, the sector in which bankrupt 
firms perform, their legal form, and their age. Finally, we compare various types of debt 
according to their level of legal protection: the absolute priority rule distinguishes between claims 
with super-priority status (recent unpaid wages, less than two months), claims with a general 
privilege status (employees, tax authorities and bankruptcy costs), claims with a special privilege 
status (secured claims with collateral), and junior claims. A natural question is how the structure 
of a bankrupt firm’s liabilities affects the final decision of the commercial court. 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the model using multivariate regression analysis. We report the 
coefficients for reorganization and sale as a going concern, relative to liquidation. As explained 
below, our hypothesis of the influence of the first article of bankruptcy law on court decisions is 
supported by the data. As predicted, by controlling for firm-level characteristics, commercial 
courts work to promote continuation in order to maintain employment. The number of both 
connected and unconnected measures – which are a proxy for restructuring efforts of commercial 
courts so as to promote continuation – have a large, positive and statistically significant effect on 
the probability of continuation, over the probability of liquidation
40. Moreover, the level of 
unsecured claims significantly increases the probability of both bankruptcy procedures that 
enable continuation. Since the level of unsecured claims a priori is positively correlated with the 
risk of domino effects, this suggests that the continuation of bankrupt firms reduces domino 
effects. We suggest (but do not prove) that French bankruptcy courts, which are intended to 
preserve employment through the continuation of firms, also deliberately aim to reduce domino 
effects. 
 
                                                 
36 It is more likely that courts take into account the levels of the different claims rather than their relative structure. 
37 Only “connected measures” can be considered as endogenous at the level of 5% on the earlier sample (i.e. 1985 
Law). The results obtained for this variable on the first sample should therefore be considered with caution. 
38 Appendix 3 tests the risk of endogeneity for the coverage rate: endogeneity is rejected on both samples. 
39 Employees are both an ex ante constraint and a variable that may affect the courts’ ex post decision 
40 The causes of financial distress (and the sector in which the firm performs) help little in explaining the court’s 
decision. This reflects the low difference between bankrupt firms apart from their level of debt outstanding and their 
coverage rate.   13
TABLE 2 
ESTIMATES OF OUTCOMES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 
 
Estimation Prob. > χ² Estimation Prob. > χ² Estimation Prob. > χ² Estimation Prob. > χ²
Constant -7.3682*** <.0001 -9.2272*** <.0001 -3.8693*** <.0001 -2.965*** 0.0027
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: outlets -0.4589** 0.0401 -0.5513* 0.0765 0.0560 0.8648 -0.256 0.4666
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: strategy -0.5952 0.1794 -0.4282 0.4983 0.1708 0.7522 0.2469 0.6623
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: production 0.0963 0.7304 0.8530** 0.0145 -0.0831 0.8194 -0.1341 0.7098
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: finance 0.2266 0.3046 -0.3347 0.3252 0.1875 0.6318 -0.0247 0.9537
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: management 0.1129 0.6475 0.3804 0.2253 0.4459 0.3548 -0.0595 0.9158
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: accident -0.2697 0.3879 -0.0890 0.8372 0.5174 0.2222 0.7576* 0.0766
Nb. cause(s) defaut: external environment -0.4422 0.1309 -0.3721 0.3589 0.2533 0.5279 0.8111** 0.0473
Nb. of connected measure(s)  0.5069** 0.0261 0.9878*** 0.0005 0.1334 0.7385 0.8145** 0.0331
Nb. of unconnected measure(s)  0.9231*** 0.0002 1.7598*** <.0001 1.0005** 0.0158 1.4746*** 0.0004
Nb. of legal measure(s) (enforcements…) 0.8623 0.332 0.0978 0.9235 -1.8322 0.1718 -2.4100* 0.0736
Suspect period declared (cf. suspection of tricks) -0.9121*** 0.0002 -0.5624* 0.0625 0.0822 0.7421 -0.0327 0.9042
Coverage rate (economic value of assets / debts) 2.2373*** <.0001 6.1739*** <.0001 -0.0180 0.9775 0.8335 0.1949
Legal form: limited responsibility -0.4291 0.1279 -0.4819 0.1525 -0.7823** 0.0319 -0.1029 0.7898
Sector: commercial business (ref. industry) -0.1292 0.6242 -1.2518*** 0.0017 -0.1905 0.5806 -0.3549 0.3203
Sector: services (ref. industry) 0.2981 0.1671 0.6213** 0.0491 0.3401 0.2329 0.1941 0.507
Ln(firm's age) 0.8789*** <.0001 1.2828*** <.0001 0.4936** 0.0248 0.2097 0.3626
Ln(employees) 0.5800*** 0.0011 -0.1457 0.5719 0.9287*** 0.0019 0.1035 0.7416
Ln(debts: "superprivilège") (=recent unpaid wages) -0.0402 0.6841 0.0804 0.6106 -0.7465*** <.0001 -0.8737*** <.0001
Ln(debts: secured claims: collaterals) 0.1486* 0.0961 -0.1868 0.1097 0.0830 0.3851 0.1095 0.283
Ln(debts: secured claims: State & employees) 0.2751*** 0.0002 0.1648 0.1095 0.1045 0.5716 0.2931 0.1135
Ln(debts: unsecured claims) 0.2549** 0.0152 0.2787** 0.0459 0.4383*** 0.0009 0.2868** 0.0346
 Test                   Khi 2    Pr > Khi 2  Test                   Khi 2    Pr > Khi 2
 Likelihood Ratio   542.82  <.0001 Likelihood Ratio   182.53  <.0001
 Score              462.95  <.0001  Score              150.87  <.0001
 Wald               187.29  <.0001  Wald               101.62  <.0001
Legislation 10/06/1994  ( 267 companies )
Output = sale
as a going concern
(ref. liquidation)
Output = firm's 
reorganization
(réf. liquidation)
Multinonial independant LOGIT regression
Variables:
Output = sale
as a going concern
(ref. liquidation)
Output = firm's 
reorganization
(réf. liquidation)
Legislation 25/01/1985  ( 557 companies )
 
 
NOTE. – This table sets out the results of logit regression of the determinants of the type of continuation (either 
reorganization or sale as a going concern) upon the eventual decision to liquidate the firm piecemeal. We distinguish 
financially distressed firms which filed for bankruptcy before and since 1994. In both samples, the dependent 
variables are the probabilities of sale and of reorganization relative to the probability of liquidation. Coefficients 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
Economic and financial ex ante constraints also play a crucial role in the court’s decision making 
during the bankruptcy process. In other words, even if the efforts of commercial courts in favour 
of continuation have an effect on the outcome of bankruptcy, other factors may pre-determine the 
outcome. The probability of sale as a going concern depends strongly on the offer side constraint, 
since offers are strongly linked to the size of the firm (proxied here by the number of employees). 
Continuation, either by reorganization or sale, depends mainly on the bankrupt firm’s 
characteristics: the economic value of its assets relative to its debts (see coverage rate), its age, or 
its capacity to pay wages (see level of claims with a super-priority status). Bankruptcy law may 
also have an effect on these constraints through efforts toward prevention. This may explain why, 
before the legal reform in 1994, only internal causes (outlets, production) affected the probability 
of reorganization and/or sale; whereas, for continuations taking place after 1994, only external 
causes (accident, external environment) positively influence the probability of reorganization.   14
Second, the fact that continuation is not determined after 1994 by the coverage rate implies that 
earlier resolution of financial distresses, due to the efforts of prevention, strengthens the value of 
bankrupt firms, especially those which end up in liquidation. Third, the declaration of a suspect 
period is a means to discourage default delaying before prevention was reinforced, lots of firms 




To summarize, we find strong indications that French commercial courts actively seek to promote 
continuation during the bankruptcy process. Yet, this action is subject to severe external 
constraints, which the development of prevention, initiated by the legal reform of 1994, has 
successfully reduced. 
 
B. The choice between rival sales as a going concern 
 
If commercial courts follow the implicit hierarchy established by the first article of French 
legislation, they should promote sale propositions which are more likely to maintain employment. 
To consider this effect, we focus on sales which involved two or more rival buyout proposals 
(respectively 169 and 123 proposals for the 01/25/1985 and 06/10/1994 samples). The explained 
variable is the probability for a plan to be chosen by the court. The explicative variables are the 
plan’s characteristics (either accepted or refused), as reported by the administrator
42. Several 
indexes were set up in order to standardize these characteristics. The first is the proposed price 
(out of debts), as a basis for ex-post financial efficiency: if this is taken into account by the 
courts, the price should positively influence their choice. The second set of variables deals with 
the qualities of the offer, which determine the future of the bankrupt firm and its employees with 
a new owner (the offer “preserves employment”, the buyer is “financially strong”, “experienced”, 
or “reputable”); of course, preservation of employment is of key interest since it maintains
43 
social efficiency. We use a third set of indicators for the motivation of the offer (the expected 
synergy, the absorption of a competitor, the diversification of business, or the increase of 
reputation). Following the approach of McFadden (1974), we run a conditional logit regression to 
model the court’s choice between competing proposals. The probability is equal to one if a 
proposal is accepted by the court, and zero if it is refused. Table 3 presents the regression results. 
                                                 
41 We evaluate the financial efficiency of the declaration of a suspect period in Section V. 
42 The administrator’s report (the “bilan économique et social”) is transferred to the court, for definitive decision. 
43 This is a commitment announced by the buyer. The buyer may not adhere to those commitments in the future 
(especially social ones). Such behaviour is subject to certain sanctions, especially since the 1994 reform.   15
TABLE 3 
ESTIMATES OF CHOICE BETWEEN RIVAL OFFERS 
 
Estimation Prob. > χ² Estimation Prob. > χ²
4.6381 0.1779 1.5782 0.3573
3.3980*** 0.0007 1.4821** 0.0202
0.9664 0.1756 1.0101* 0.0836
0.4090 0.5345 0.5952 0.3902
0.5769 0.5463 -0.3687 0.6293
-0.6785 0.3570 0.8334 0.2667
0.2600 0.7547 1.4057 0.2613
1.5646* 0.0734 0.9699 0.3725
2.4629** 0.0192 1.6003 0.1512
0.6261 0.5931 -14.5353 0.9942
 Test                   Khi 2    Pr > Khi 2     Khi 2    Pr > Khi 2
Likelihood Ratio   41.7545 <.0001 24.4837 0.0064
 Score              33.2905 0.0002 21.4333 0.0183
 Wald               17.3933 0.0661 13.7616 0.1841
Quality of the offer: the buyer is financially strong
Quality of the offer: the buyer is experimented
Quality of the offer: the buyer is reputed
Variables
Legislation 25/01/1985
( 169 propositions )
Legislation 10/06/1994
( 123 propositions )
Conditional LOGIT regression
Proposed sale price (out of owed debts)
Motive for the buyout: synergy
Motive for the buyout: absorption of a competitor
Motive for the buyout: diversification of business
Motive for the buyout: first affair
Motive for the buyout: increase the reputation
Quality of the offer: preserve employment
 
 
NOTE. – The table gives results of conditional logit regression of rival offers when a firm was sold as a going 
concern. The dependent variable equals 1 if the judge accepts the offer, and 0 if he rejects it. Coefficients significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
The fact that an offer is likely to preserve employment does indeed have a key impact on the 
court’s decision when several rival buyout plans compete to restructure bankrupt firms. All other 
variables are rarely statistically significant. We do not conclude that the proposed sale price has 
no effect on bankruptcy courts; rather, we suggest that commercial courts consider each 
bankruptcy independently and that these courts choose the proposition that will save employment 
at the best price. To be more accurate, we evaluate in the next section the effect of sale as a going 
concern on creditors’ recovery rates. 
 
VI. THE “PRICE” OF SOCIAL EFFICIENCY: EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL RECOVERY RATES 
 
The relation between the various options in French bankruptcy procedures detailed in section V 
and the global recovery rate is of interest, because it links the work of commercial courts 
constrained by the first article of the French code (promoting the protection of activity and 
employment), with the potential costs/consequences (the “price”) of this policy through the 
recovery rate of all claimants
44. At the same time, this variable serves as a proxy to evaluate ex 
post financial efficiency of the bankruptcy process: if the global recovery rate is sufficiently high 
when firms continue to operate through reorganization or sale as a going concern (relative to 
liquidation), it appears that commercial courts do not commit type 1 errors
45 (or very few). In 
contrast, the common view is that debtor friendly systems fail to eliminate bankrupt firms which 
are economically inefficient. 
                                                 
44 We consider that bankruptcy courts maximise the joint welfare of various stakeholders. 
45 Type 1 errors occur when some economically inefficient failing firms are mistakenly categorized as efficient and 
are allowed to reorganize. 
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To consider the “price” of social efficiency, we propose two complementary approaches. First, 
we compute ANOVA tests on the averages of recovery rates for each possible course (immediate 
liquidation, liquidation after an observation period, reorganization, and sales as a going concern) 
in order to: (1) compare the different levels of recovery rates (averages) between courses; and (2) 
test whether these averages differ significantly between the courses of action. If the average 
recovery rates appear to be lower (resp. higher) for continuations than for liquidations, we can 
infer that the protection of social efficiency – through a preference for continuations – has a cost 
(resp. gain) in terms of ex post financial efficiency. Second, for each outcome (either continuation 
or liquidation
46), we use a double censored tobit model to regress the global recovery rate 
(defined on the [0,1] interval) on a set of variables representing (1) the way default has been 
managed (before and after bankruptcy), (2) the firm’s characteristics, and (3) the importance of 
financial distress. We are thereby able to isolate variables affecting the global recovery rate (i.e. 
ex post financial efficiency) for each possible outcome (liquidation or continuation). This model 
identifies, once social efficiency is preserved through continuation, which variables raise or 
reduce ex post financial efficiency supposing continuation takes place. We then consider the 
same question for liquidation cases. 
 
A. Comparison of financial efficiency between the rival bankruptcy courses 
 
To determine the financial efficiency of the French bankruptcy process, we show in Table 4 the 
structure of claims and the recovery rates for each class of creditors. 
 
From the different classes of creditors, it appears that the higher the level of unsecured liabilities, 
the smaller is the global recovery rate. This seems natural, because junior claimants have lower 
recovery rates than other stakeholders due to their ranking under the French absolute priority rule. 
However, we also suggest that these losses (i.e. low recovery rates) reflect the cost induced by the 
reduction of bankruptcy domino effects as shown in the previous section. Last, new money (i.e. 
claims arising after the bankruptcy triggering) also plays a specific role: new creditors recover as 
much as (or more than) the average. This fact has led to severe criticism of the French law: in 
particular, bankers saw this highest priority of new money over anterior secured creditors as a 
threat to collateralization. This is why the legislator modified the law in 1994, giving higher 
priority to long-term securitized claims over new money (in cases of liquidation). In our opinion, 
this debate is of minor importance, because we find that new money is marginal when reported 
on the total of claims (from 0% up to 5.6%); in fact, most post default payments are paid in cash. 
 
The crucial question is now whether the maintenance of social efficiency involves a loss of 
financial efficiency. This is likely to happen if recovery rates are significantly lower for 
continuations than for liquidations. The differences observed between global recovery rates in 
reorganization and liquidation cases (between 66% and 74% for continuations, and between 12% 
and 26% for liquidations
47) now indicate that bankruptcy courts accurately classify firms as 
                                                 
46 Here, we mix sales and reorganizations among continuations. Unlike in section V, our purpose is not to explain the 
trade-off between all possible issues, but to explain the recovery rates associated with the two major distinct 
outcomes of any bankruptcy procedure, continuation or liquidation. 
47 The figures for the later period take higher values than in the first period. Indeed, due to the development of 
prevention procedures to force financially distressed firms to file earlier for bankruptcy or to promote out-of-court 
negotiation (such as “règlement amiable”), recovery rates in reorganization and liquidation are much higher. For 
sales as a going concern, however, we find the opposite effect.   17
economically efficient versus inefficient when they approve continuation through reorganization. 
Thus, we do not find empirical evidence of a trade-off between social efficiency and financial 
efficiency; in fact the best way to continue the firm’s operations (i.e. reorganization) exhibits also 
the largest average recovery rate. In contrast, the difference in recovery rates in reorganization 
versus sale as a going concern is sufficiently large (nearly 50 points) to conclude that 
continuation through sales achieves a lower level of ex post financial efficiency, but not worse 
than for liquidations. 
 
TABLE 4 
















Employ's "superprivilège" 2,4% 4,3% 3,1% 1,7% 1,62 4,1% 3,9% 15,8% 15,3% 27.57***
New money 0,0% 5,6% 0,0% 0,0% 22.10*** 4,2% 0,4% 0,0% 3,2% 13.71***
State & employees 15,4% 19,7% 10,1% 9,3% 4.70*** 29,6% 32,2% 42,0% 44,3% 4.84***
Collaterals 29,6% 19,3% 37,9% 35,3% 9.60*** 12,3% 19,6% 8,0% 6,4% 4.05***
Unsecured 52,6% 51,1% 48,8% 53,6% 0,87 50,4% 44,0% 34,2% 30,9% 6.31***
Variables whose Fisher's stat. is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***,**, and * respectively.



























Employ.'s "superprivilège" 88,2% 89,8% 57,8% 80,4% 60,2% 3.92** 84,5% 91,3% 75,0% 74,2% 75,4% 3.44**
New money n.s. 73,2% n.s. n.s. n.s. - 60,7% n.s. n.s. 25,0% n.s. -
Secured (all) 44,2% 64,6% 19,2% 27,1% 20,1% 12.90*** 31,0% 73,4% 19,5% 28,8% 21,6% 18.31***
 - State & employees 41,8% 63,0% 23,0% 25,4% 24,1% 13.01*** 30,7% 73,7% 15,3% 28,2% 17,8% 22.19***
 - Collaterals 42,5% 63,9% 17,7% 29,3% 18,8% 11.13*** 35,0% 72,0% 36,0% 50,0% 38,0% 13.64***
Unsecured 10,5% 64,5% 5,1% 6,8% 5,7% 43.66*** 6,2% 72,1% 2,5% 6,2% 4,9% 286.12***
Total 24,0% 65,7% 12,1% 16,2% 12,9% 16.67*** 23,9% 73,8% 23,5% 26,0% 24,9% 65.91***
Variables whose Fisher's stat. is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***,**, and * respectively.
n.s. = non significative figures (no enough observations: less than 1% of the total of claims - sample size).









NOTE. – The upper table gives the structure of various claims. Creditors are ordered according to their level of 
priority: (1) claims with a super priority status, (2) post filing priority claims, (3) claims with a privilege status, (4) 
secured claims, (5) junior claims. The lower table provides the recovery rates of different classes of creditor for the 
four possibilities: sale, reorganization, liquidation (immediate or after a period of observation). Recovery rates are 
given as a percentage of the claims. In both tables, ANOVA tests are shown: averages differing significantly from 
one possibility to another at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (Fisher statistic) are denoted ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
B. The factors of financial efficiency for each possible bankruptcy outcome 
 
Table 5 sets out the results of double censored tobit regression of the post default global recovery 
rate (privileged, secured, and junior) for liquidations (immediate or not) and for continuations 
(sales and reorganization plans). A tobit model is appropriate, since the estimated recovery rate is 
between zero and one: appendix 4 gives the density functions of the recovery rates for liquidation 
and continuation for both samples. By construction, the tobit approach is subject to 
heteroscedasticity, since the variance of errors depends on the explanatory variables; thus, the 
hypothesis of multiplicative heteroscedasticity
48 was tested for every model, and was accepted (at 
                                                 
48 For the heteroscedastic model, the test is of the form  ) z ( i
2 2
i γ σ = σ ε ' exp , where 
2
i σ  is the variance of the error for 
observation (i); 
2
ε σ  is a constant parameter (i.e. the variance of the error if the model was homoscedastic);  i z  is a 
non significant  18
the 1% level) in almost all cases (excepted for the model on continuations under the 1994 
legislation). We include only the “coverage rate” (i.e. the economic value of assets relative to 
debts) as a source of heteroscedasticity; indeed, this rate is expected to increase with the number 
of censored observations. Consequently, to model heteroscedasticity, we restrain the analysis to 
the subset of variables that may lead the recovery rate to its extreme values (i.e. 0 or 1). This is 
the case of the coverage rate, whose level is the starting point of all future recoveries (i.e. a 
low/high coverage rate is likely to bring about a null/100% global recovery rate). The density 
functions of residuals for the four regressions are given in appendix 5. 
 
TABLE 5 
ESTIMATES OF GLOBAL RECOVERY RATES 
 
Estimation Estimation Estimation Estimation
Constant 0.0398 0.4287 0.4506** 0.0101 -0.2187 0.2037 0.6406** 0.0159
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: outlets 0.0025 0.7907 -0.0499** 0.0466 -0.0159 0.6048 -0.0382 0.4951
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: strategy -0.0308 0.1186 -0.0854* 0.0903 -0.0078 0.8759 -0.0240 0.7596
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: production -0.0001 0.9931 -0.0436 0.1365 -0.0725** 0.0192 -0.0941 0.1261
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: finance -0.0163 0.1345 -0.0604** 0.0241 -0.0236 0.5182 0.0420 0.5152
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: management -0.0301** 0.0114 -0.0454* 0.0687 0.1733*** 0.0024 -0.0364 0.6072
Nb. cause(s) of defaut: accident 0.0065 0.6215 0.0336 0.3896 0.0340 0.4497 0.1248** 0.0208
Nb. cause(s) defaut: external environment -0.0081 0.5243 0.0303 0.3029 0.0337 0.3717 -0.0091 0.8763
Nb. of connected measure(s)  -0.0132 0.5179 0.0439*** 0.0099 0.0372 0.5539 0.1438*** 0.0023
Nb. of unconnected measure(s)  0.0042 0.8334 0.0148 0.4202 -0.0449 0.3341 0.0281 0.4811
Nb. of legal measure(s) (enforcements…) 0.0212 0.8195 -0.0392 0.5475 -0.2153 0.4883 0.2377 0.2561
Suspect period declared (cf. suspection of tricks) -0.0551*** 0.0005 0.0165 0.7531 0.0631 0.1847 -0.0269 0.7323
Legal form: limited responsibility 0.0310 0.1746 -0.1263* 0.0531 0.2026** 0.0326 0.0196 0.8536
Sector: commercial business (ref. industry) -0.0130 0.5119 0.0967* 0.0787 -0.0290 0.6274 0.0089 0.9207
Sector: services (ref. industry) 0.0000 0.9987 0.0094 0.8385 -0.0687 0.1496 0.0194 0.8211
Ln(firm's age) 0.0093 0.3770 -0.0293 0.2658 0.0324* 0.0936 0.0371 0.2751
Ln(employees) 0.0146** 0.0311 -0.0286 0.1242 0.0021 0.9241 -0.1066*** <.0001
Unsecured claims / Total claims -0.0009 0.9715 -0.1118 0.1159 -0.0605 0.4366 -0.2572** 0.0364
Current assets (excluding cash) / Total assets -0.0139 0.4705 -0.1151* 0.0583 -0.0142 0.7822 -0.1093 0.3026
Coverage rate (economic value of assets / debts) 0.7752*** <.0001 0.6254*** <.0001 0.3588*** <.0001 0.2007** 0.0299
Variance of errors (sigma) 0.0736*** <.0001 0.1222*** <.0001 0.0914*** <.0001 0.3540*** <.0001
Multiplicative heteroscedasticity: coverage rate 4.0380*** <.0001 2.1435*** <.0001 2.4077*** <.0001 - -
  Log likelihood: 88.13   Log likelihood: -34.43   Log likelihood: 27.50   Log likelihood: -75.38
  Heterosced. test: 153.53   Heterosced. test: 13.94   Heterosced. test: 11.34   Heterosced. test: 0.08
  Inferior bound: 0   Inferior bound: 0   Inferior bound: 0   Inferior bound: 0
  Superior bound: 1  Superior bound: 1  Superior bound: 1   Superior bound: 1
  Inf. bd. (nb. obs): 81  Inf. bd. (nb. obs): 13  Inf. bd. (nb. obs): 0   Inf. bd. (nb. obs): 7
  Sup. bd. (nb.obs): 8  Sup. bd. (nb.obs): 12  Sup. bd. (nb.obs): 2   Sup. bd. (nb.obs): 16
Liquidations
( 94 obs.)
Double censored TOBIT regression
(with heteroscedasticity, except for year
1994: sales & reorganizations)
Variables:
Prob. > |t| Prob. > |t| Prob. > |t|
Endogeneous variable: Total recovery rate
Legislation 25/01/1985
( 545 observations )
Legislation 10/06/1994










NOTE. – Table 5 sets out the results of a double censored tobit regression of the global recovery rate, either for 
liquidation or continuation (reorganization and sale as going concern). The endogenous variable takes a value 
between zero and one (see appendix 4). We use similar explanatory variables to the first regression analysis. We add 
a measure of the percentage of junior claims relative to the sum of all claims (Unsecured claims/Total claims). The 
variance of the errors is an output of the tobit approach (linked to the expression of conditional moments). Table 5 
provides also the results of the tests for heteroscedasticity: in one case only, when homoscedasticity was accepted. 
Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are respectively indicated by ***, **, and *. 
 
The firm specific explanatory variables remain nearly the same as for the first regression 
analysis: the explanatory variables are (1) the origin of the default and the way it was managed, 
                                                                                                                                                              
subset of the explanatory variables ( i x );  γ  are the parameters influencing the variance of errors, through their effect 
on the  i z  variables.   19
(2) the firm’s characteristics, and (3) the importance of financial distress. We analyse their effect 
on the global recovery rate for each outcome: continuation, then liquidation. 
 
Continuation (through sales or reorganization plans) is the privileged outcome from the French 
bankruptcy law perspective, because it is considered the best way to ensure social efficiency. 
Then the question becomes: once social efficiency is likely to arise through continuation, to what 
extent can the court increase ex-post financial efficiency? Analysis of some explanatory variables 
helps to answer this question. For continuations taking place under the 1985 legislation, several 
causes (outlets, strategy, finance, and management) negatively affect the global recovery rate, 
which is no longer true for continuations under the 1994 legislation (only accidents significantly 
increase the amounts recovered). The interpretation is straightforward and is directly linked to the 
development of prevention after 1994: before this date, the courts were facing many delayed 
defaults, so that ex-post efficiency (proxied by the global recovery rate) was mostly pre-
determined by ex-ante factors, prior to any legal post-intervention. The increasing role of 
prevention after 1994 has changed matters, so that – on average – ex-post efficiency is no longer 
affected by external ex-ante factors
49. In section V, the measures undertaken under the courts’ 
supervision were positively correlated with the issue of continuations; this suggests that French 
courts actively prepare continuations over liquidations, and by doing this promote social 
efficiency. Additionally, within these continuations, some measures (the “connected” ones) are 
undertaken by the courts, so that the global recovery rate is also increased. This result is of prime 
importance, because it does not exactly confirm pure trade-off between social and financial 
efficiencies, but rather a hierarchy of objectives: once some measures have made continuation a 
promising issue, the court allows or facilitates measures that raise the creditors’ recovered 
amounts. Yet this does not mean there is no trade-off: indeed, focusing on the effect of the 
number of employees on the recovery rate (which is significant and negative after the 1994 
reform), the continuation seems to be less financially efficient when it applies to firms with 
higher employment stakes
50. 
To sum-up: for continuations, the trade-off between social and financial efficiency is partially 
confirmed, when looking at big firms; but this does not mean that courts are unable to increase 
ex-post financial every time they can. On the contrary, the observation period also provides the 
opportunity to undertake measures aimed at increasing the global recovery rate. 
 
According to the French bankruptcy view, liquidations should be the default output of the 
bankruptcy when social efficiency cannot be reached by other means. The question then 
becomes: once liquidation appears to be unavoidable, can the Courts promote at least financial 
efficiency? The answer depends on the context, as shown in the comparison between 1985 
liquidations and post-1994 liquidations. Because of the lack of prevention, under the 1985 law, 
the bulk of liquidations dealt with firms having nearly zero assets, so that liquidation is more a 
statement than a choice. We consider also that courts can declare a “suspect period” in order to 
recover some previously sold assets or cancel doubtful contracts, if any. But this strategy does not 
achieve to increase the proceeds to share between claimants; on the contrary, the dummy variable 
“suspect period” has a significant negative impact on the global recovery rate. From the same 
perspective, the number of employees has a positive effect on the global recovery rate for the 
                                                 
49 Since the triggering of bankruptcy takes place sooner when the origin of default is accidental, it is not surprising 
that accidents only positively affect recovery rates after 1994 (see Table 4). 
50 This takes place mainly through sales, which are the privileged mode of continuation for big firms.   20
1985-law sample; this reflects the case of firms with numerous employees and significant levels 
of assets, leading to higher recovery rates. 
To summarize: for liquidations, whatever the period (post or prior 1994), commercial courts have 
no significant way to improve financial efficiency, and the firm’s situation at the moment of 
bankruptcy filing settles the outcome. Further, under the 1985 law, the suspect period has a 
significant and negative impact on global recovery rates. Since the 1994 reform, the variables 
increasing the global recovery rate under liquidation are also out of the court’s area of action; 
these variables are the causes of default (production and management difficulties), the legal form 
(limited liability), and the age of the firm. 
 
Overall, there does not appear to be a significant area for the courts to improve financial 
efficiency during the bankruptcy process except for continuations, where some “connected 
measures” (as defined above) significantly improve the global recovery rate. 
 
As shown in subsection VI.A, however, the large increase in various claimants’ recovery rates 




In developed countries, the main goals of bankruptcy law are to restructure, or to close down if 
restructuring is impossible; and to provide claimants (tax authorities, employees, secured and 
unsecured creditors) with an absolute priority rule for debt recovery. In practice, however, many 
differences exist in the rules that govern bankrupt firms and in the objectives of national 
bankruptcy codes. In this area of comparative law, several of our conclusions show that French 
bankruptcy courts actively protect employment at the time of the choice 1) between 
reorganization, sale as a going concern or liquidation, and 2) between rival offers for a sale as a 
going concern of bankrupt firms. More precisely, the strong correlation between the probability 
of continuation and legal measures engaged and the level of unsecured debt of bankrupt firms 
demonstrate that commercial courts seek to protect employment by promoting continuation and 
reducing the domino effects of bankruptcy. Furthermore, the implicit rules that govern the court’s 
choice between rival offers for the sale of bankrupt firms confirm that social considerations have 
an impact on the decisions of bankruptcy courts. A further key outcome of this research is the 
determination of the financial cost of this bias. Reorganizations generate the highest recovery 
rates for all classes of creditors; the fact that bankruptcy courts seek to preserve employment 
through continuation of bankrupt firms does not imply a severe cost for other stakeholders. 
Moreover, contrary to the expected trade-off between social and financial considerations, courts 
engage also in measures to increase debt recoveries once continuation has been chosen. However, 
for sale as a going concern, recovery rates are inhibited by asset illiquidity or by the court’s 
attempt to promote the firm’s continuation (and also preserve employment) through sale at a low 
price.   21
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VIII. APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix 1: Sample structure, and comparison of Parisian and French bankruptcies 
 
Graphs A1 and A2 show the repartition of the sample over time. The first sample is for 
bankrupt firms under the 01/25/1985 bankruptcy code. The second sample gathers corporate 
bankruptcy files triggered off after the 06/10/1994 reform. 
 
Graph A1. First Sample     Graph A2. Second Sample 
 
Year of the bankruptcy termination







1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
%
    
 
 
Table A1. Comparison of Parisian and National populations 
 
1994 2005 1994 2005
Limited responsibility 78.2 84.4 60.8 68.0
Other legal forms 21.8 15.7 39.3 32.0
Commerce 27.3 25.6 28.9 27.0
Industry
(1) 31.9 34.0 33.7 35.2
Services
(1) 40.9 40.4 37.4 37.8
Continuations (reorganizations and sales) 7.1 5.6 7.0
(2) 11.0
Liquidations (immediate or not) 92.9 94.5 93.0
(2) 89.0
Sources: France: INSEE; Paris: Paris Commercial Court.
(1) Agriculture, and financial services excluded.
(2) For year 1995: see J. Domens, "Les défaillances d'entreprises entre 1993et 2004", coll°. "PME/TPE en 






Appendix 2: Structure of the templates and codification of the origin of default and of 
engaged legal measures 
 
Table A2 provides the general structure of our templates. The table collects 230 variables 
gathered into 7 different groups. Group 1 identifies the bankrupt company / group of companies. 
Group 2 gathers variables describing the bankruptcy process and the origin of default. Group 3a 
identifies the type of procedure – from triggering to final outcome. Group 3b provides financial 
information on assets and liabilities according to the type of claim. Group 3c codifies the 
measures enacted by the court during the observation period. Group 3d deals with the amounts 
recovered and the characteristics of buyout proposals (if any). Group 3e specifies legal sanctions 
against the managers (if any). 
Year of the bankruptcy termination
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Table A2. General structure of the templates 
 
1. Company's identification 3b. Financial information and bankruptcy costs
  Matriculation number  Declared market values of assets (triggering time).
 Sector (French NAF national codification)  Verified claims by levels of priority (end of the procedure)
 Geographical localization  Number of creditors.
 Number of employees  Bankruptcy costs individual estimation (décret 85-1390 of the 12/27/1985)
 Legal form 3c. Engaged measures / legal measures
 Creation date
 Engaged measures during the bankruptcy procédure (up to 10), each of them is subject 
to the Court approval.
 Manager(s): age, functions, nb. of administrators…  Identification of the legal practitioners
2. Process of default 3d. Procedure outcome
 Origin of default (up to 10 cumulative causes, based on a specific codification (51 codes). 
The identification of causes stems from an audit engaged by the administrator.
 Realized value of assets (if liquidation)
3. The bankruptcy procedure (from triggering to the final issue)
 Characteristics of the buyout plan(s) (if any), in case of a sale as a going concern (price, 
pros and cons of the offer, as analyzed by the legal administrator)
3a Type of procedure  Characteristics of the reorganization plan (length of the plan, repayment schedule…)
 Type of the legal procedure (simplified or not) 3e. Legal sanctions against managers (if any)
 Date of triggering and of ending  Suspect period
 Identity of the bankruptcy's initiator  Pecuniary sanctions
 Legal issue: liquidation, sale, reorganization  Extra pecuniary sanctions
 Remark: all files are closed files (with definitive recovery rates).  Type of fault  
 
Table A3 sets out the codifications we used for the causes of default and the measures enacted. 
They are gathered into 8 groups: outlets, strategy, production, finance, management, accident, 
and external environment. 
 
Table A3. Codification of the causes of default and the engaged measures 
 
Outlets
[1] Brutal disappearance of customers; [2] Customer(s) in default; [3] 
Product(s) too expensive (selling price is too high); [4] Bad evaluation of the 
market; [5] Product(s) too cheap (selling price is too low); [6] Unsuitable 
products; [7] Obsolete products; [8] Loss of market shares (regular fall of the 
firm's demand).
[1] Improvement of products (extension of the range); [2] Innovation, 
increase of research and development; [3] Advertisement, better knowledge 
of the market, commercial effort; [4] Lower selling prices; [5] Reorganization 
of activities (abandon of unprofitable activities, development of the more 
profitable ones).
Strategy
[1] Youth of the company (inexperience); [2] Voluntary dissolution of the 
activity;[3] Failure of important projects (partnerships, investments, 
reorganizations);[4] Voluntary acceptance of little profitable markets 
(dumping...).
[1] Diversification of the economic partners; [2] Concentration on peculiar 
economic partners; [3] New shareholder in the capital; [4] Non renewal of 
peculiar contracts (non profitable markets); [5] New hiring.
Production
[1] Production capacity was too strong, overinvestment; [2] Depreciation of 
assets(active persons); [3] Operating costs were too high (other than wages: 
external expenses, raw materials...); [4] Wages expenses were too high; [5] 
Brutal disapearance of suppliers; [6] Unsuitable process of production 
(obsolete); [7] Under-investment.
[1] New investments; [2] Cancellation of projects (investments); [3] 
Economic reorganizations (mergers and acquisitions, partnerships, 
alliances); [4] Increase of selling price; [5] Decrease of operating costs; [6] 
Firings; [7] Decrease of wages.
Finance
[1] Longer delays on accounts receivable; [2] Contagion / reported losses 
from subsidiaries; [3] Shorter delays on accounts payable; [4] Speculation of 
the company, problems due to exchange rates fluctuation; [5] Stop of the 
financial support from the head office / holding; [6] Lack of equity (compared 
to leverage/liabilities); [7] Loan refusal to the company; [8] Stop/reduction of 
previous State financial subventions to the firm; [9] Contractual interest rates 
are too high.
[1] Obtaining public subvention(s); [2] Sale of fixed or financial assets; [3] 
Sale / liquidation of inventory; [4] Recovery on accounts receivable; [5] Raise 
of stockholders' equity; [6] Decrease of the financial risk (less 
speculation…); [7] Total or partial repayment to previous creditors; [8] 
Rescheduling of payments, remissions of a debt (private renegotiation); [9] 
Attempt of informal renegotiation; [10] Cash raising from new creditors; [11] 
New loans; [12] Claims forgiveness from the leaders / owners.
Management
[1] Weak accounts reporting / informational system is deficient; [2] Problems 
of competence; [3] Disagreements among the directors / managers; [4] 
Excessive takings from the managers; [5] Insufficient provisions; [6] Lack of 
knowledge on the real level of costs of returns (causing too weak selling); [7] 
Bad evaluation of inventory; [8] Problems of transmission of the company / 
difficulties in restructuring.
[1] Improvement of the competence (training, hiring of skilled persons); [2] 
Appeal to outside experts; [3] Substantial change of the managerial staff; [4] 
Change of the rules of accounting (or of the rules of management); 
Management: Better knowledge of the costs of returns.
Accident
[1] Swindle / embezzlements affecting the company (whatever its origin); [2] 
Another insolvency procedure (for other companies) is extended to the firm 
(same patrimonies); [3] Disputes with public partners (fiscal inquiry); [4] 
Disputes with private partners; [5] Death / disease / disappearance of the 




[1] Unfavorable fluctuation of the exchange rates; [2] Increase of the 
competition; [3] Decreasing demand to the sector; [4] “Force majeure” (war, 
natural catastrophe, industrial crisis, politics, bad price evolution); [5] Public 
policy less favorable to the sector; [6] Period of credit crunch; [7] The 
general level of interest rates is too high; [8] Macroeconomic increase of 
operating costs (raw materials, GMW…).
Non applicable
Origin of the default
(codifications)
Measures engaged by the administrator
during the bankruptcy procedure (codifications)
 
 
NOTE. – The table lists the principal origins of default and the legal measures enacted by the administrator 
during the bankruptcy process. We set against each other the causes of default and the measures enacted by the 
court in order to determine whether they are connected. We also set the exogenous origins of default (accident, 
external environment) against the endogenous ones (strategy, production, finance or management).   25
Table A4 provides the repartition of the causes of default, per outcome, and the results of 
ANOVA tests: averages differ significantly between outcomes at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
when the Fisher statistic is tagged with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
























Outlets 50.0 44.2 43.2 60.9 44.0 1.13 55.6 46.6 56.1 67.9 56.5 1.06
Finance 53.3 31.6 25.8 40.2 26.7 2.15* 24.4 26.1 23.2 25.0 23.4 0.56
Accident 22.1 28.4 26.5 31.5 26.7 0.85 24.4 33.0 19.5 25.0 20.4 0.64
Production 36.1 40.0 16.2 26.1 17.0 6.38** 28.9 25.0 14.6 35.7 16.6 0.97
Environment 31.1 28.4 20.6 30.4 21.2 0.28 41.1 45.5 12.2 46.4 16.0 3.07**
Strategy 19.7 11.6 11.8 21.7 12.3 0.88 16.7 12.5 13.4 21.4 13.9 0.16
Management 30.3 27.4 21.9 27.2 22.2 1.15 15.6 9.1 11.0 14.3 11.2 0.21
Nb. of causes 
per firm 
3.2 2.8 2.0 2.9 2.1 - 2.3 2.2 1.8 2.8 1.9 -
Sample: Bankruptcy Law 10/06/1994 Sample: Bankruptcy Law 25/01/1985
Causes of 
bankruptcy





Appendix 3: Endogeneity tests 
 
The corporate bankruptcy process, as captured in our templates, can be summarized as follows: 
our ex-ante variables (cause of default, size, coverage rate…) can be viewed as the bankruptcy’s 
inputs (at the date of triggering). Our post-default variables (the measures enacted by the court) 
are viewed as a part of the bankruptcy process. The process leads to a financial output, proxied 
here by the global recovery rate. We test the presence of any endogeneity bias between these two 
sets of variables, and the question becomes: regarding the obtained recovery rate, are our post-
default variables statistically explained by our ex-ante variables (endogeneity), or not explained 
(exogenity)? The answer is not straightforward because the court’s measures are not classified by 
function, like the causes (finance, management, production…), but by nature (connected or not 
with the causes, as explained above). We shall see that this peculiar definition of measures 
reduces the risk of endogeneity. 
 
We use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman procedure dedicated to endogeneity testing, and model the 
global recovery rate as a function of both ex-ante and ex-post variables, as above. Our ex ante 
variables (cause of default, size, coverage rate…) are then taken to be exogenous, and serve as 
instruments. The DWH test is a two-step procedure: first, an OLS estimation is performed on the 
variables “connected measure” (see Table A5) and “unconnected measure” (see Table A6), using 
all ex-ante variables as explanatory variables (the complete list of these variables is given in each 
table, “step 1”). Second, we store the residuals obtained in step 1 and insert them – as another 
explanatory variable – in the OLS estimation of the global recovery rate (step 2). The value of the 
|t| of Student is then used to test for any endogeneity bias. 
 
It appears that, endogeneity is always rejected, with the exception of “connected measures” on 
the first sample (legislation of 01/25/1985). Yet, for this variable, endogeneity cannot be accepted 
at the 1% level.   26



































Variables Estimation Prob. >|t| Estimation Prob. >|t|
Constant -0.8818*** 0.0097  1.4330*** 0.0009
Legal form: limited responsibility   0.0528 0.8317 -0.4257 0.1747
Sector: commercial business (ref. industry)   0.3864* 0.0748  0.3426 0.1931
Sector: services (ref. industry)   0.4420** 0.0133  0.1711 0.4544
Ln(firm's age)   0.3972*** 0.0002  0.1855** 0.0322
Ln(employees)   0.4061*** <.0001  0.2684** 0.0216
Ln(debts: "superprivilège")   0.0350 0.4993 -0.0474 0.4088
Ln(debts: collaterals)   0.1430*** 0.0006  0.1801*** <.0001
Ln(debts: State & employees)   0.1973*** <.0001  0.2689*** 0.0006
Ln(debts: unsecured claims)   0.3139*** <.0001  0.1354*** 0.0062
Nb. of connected measures   -0.0610*** 0.7868 -0.0143 0.9715
Nb. of connected measures: residuals from step 1   0.5159** 0.0356  0.4085 0.3339
Step 2: SLS on ln(recovered amounts)
Test for endogenity bias:
2 steps Durbin-Wu-Hausman procedure
Step 1: SLS regression on the nb. of connected measures
Explicative variables: nb. causes of defaut (outlets); nb. causes of defaut (strategy); nb. causes of defaut (production); 
nb. causes of defaut (finance); nb. causes of defaut (management); nb. causes of defaut (accident); nb. causes defaut 
(external environment) ; legal form (limited responsibility); sector (commercial); sector (services); ln(firm's age); 






Variables Estimation Prob. >|t| Estimation Prob. >|t|
Constant  -0.8703***  0.0091   1.4261***  0.0008
Legal form: limited responsibility   0.0602  0.8042  -0.2223  0.5224
Sector: commercial business (ref. industry)   0.3858*  0.0708   0.2617  0.3313
Sector: services (ref. industry)   0.4383**  0.0125   0.0924  0.6765
Ln(firm's age)   0.3872***  0.0004   0.1382  0.1343
Ln(employees)   0.3899***  0.0003   0.1918  0.1073
Ln(debts: "superprivilège")   0.0347  0.4971  -0.0510  0.3577
Ln(debts: collaterals)   0.1465***  0.0002   0.1626***  <.0001
Ln(debts: State & employees)   0.1929***  <.0001   0.2913***  0.0003
Ln(debts: unsecured claims)   0.3095***  <.0001   0.1079**  0.0429
Nb. of connected measures    0.0472  0.9230   0.4926  0.2011
Nb. of unconnected measures: residuals from step 1   0.5294  0.2870  -0.1632  0.6847
Step 2: SLS on ln(recovered amounts)
Test for endogenity bias:
2 steps Durbin-Wu-Hausman procedure
Step 1: SLS regression on the nb. of unconnected measures
Explicative variables: nb. causes of defaut (outlets); nb. causes of defaut (strategy); nb. causes of defaut (production); 
nb. causes of defaut (finance); nb. causes of defaut (management); nb. causes of defaut (accident); nb. causes defaut 
(external environment) ; legal form (limited responsibility); sector (commercial); sector (services); ln(firm's age); 
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Appendix 4: Density functions of the recovery rates 
 













06/10/1994 legislation sample: liquidations 














06/10/1994 legislation sample: continuations 
Appendix 5: Density functions of the tobit residuals (see Table 4) 
 













06/10/1994 legislation sample: liquidations 









06/10/1994 legislation sample: continuations 
 